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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 









JOE BAILEY AUCTION CO. , 
Third Party Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
-vs-
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 
Third Party Defendant and 
Appellant, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 14845 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy'Bullock com-
menced this action seeking a temporary restraining order pro-
hibiting respondent Joe Bailey Auction Co., Inc., from reclaiming 
equipment sold by Bailey to Bullocks. Respondent Bailey filed 
a counterclaim against Bullocks and a third party claim against 
appellant Western Surety Company, the corporate surety under 
the temporary restraining order. Against the Bullocks, respon-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dent sought recovery of damages allegedly suffered by r ea son 
of the Bullocks' breach of the equipment sales agreement, 
including expenses of resale and loss of commission due to 
lower resale price. Respondent also sought damages from the 
Bullocks and the appellant corporate surety for expenses 
incurred by reason of the allegedly wrongful issuance of the 
temporary restraining order. 
DISPOSITION BELOW · 
The trial court dissolved the temporary restraining I 
order, and at trial dismissed appellant Bullocks' complaint ana 
entered judgment in favor of respondent on its counterclaim 
and third party complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy Bullock seek 
reversal of the judgment against them for expenses incurred 
by respondent Bailey in reselling the equipment and for loss 
of commission due to the lower resale price on the ground that 
respondent's reclamation of the equipment bars any other 
remedy. 
Appellants Russ Bullock, June Mundy Bullock and 
Western Surety Company seek reversal of the judgment entered 
against them for wrongful issuance of the temporary restrainin\ 
order on the ground that the order was not wrongful, but was I 
issued under proper circumstances. 
Appellants Russ Bullock, June Mundy Bullock and 
S C k reversal O~f the J. udgment entered Wester urety ompany see 
· h h t of respondents' counterclaim against t em on t e coun s 
-2-
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I 
L 
as to the amounts awarded by the Court as damages, which 
are unsubstantiated by the evidence presented at trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In late 1972, the appellants Russ Bullock and June 
Mundy Bullock, then June Mundy, planned to enter the water-
well drilling business in Southern Utah. Negotiations were 
entered into with a leasing company to arrange financing 
for a 5-year lease and purchase of the necessary equipment. 
The appellants arranged to attend an auction to be conducted 
by respondent in Ventura, California on December 15, 1972. 
The morning of the auction appellants contacted 
Mr. Parkes Shewmake, an auction official. Mr. Shewmake is 
one of respondent Bailey Auction Company's officers, and his 
photograph and name were printed on auction brochures. Exhib-
its D-2 and D-3. According to the uncontroverted testimony 
of June Mundy Bullock, appellants met with Shewmake at Shew-
make's motel room on the morning of the auction. Transcript 
(hereinafter T) 29:15-30. Bullocks told Shewmake that they 
had arranged financing, and they together planned to verify 
the financing by telephone because a written document was not 
available.· T 29:19. Phone verification of financing was made 
between representatives of the leasing company and auction 
company. T 33:19-34:5. The auction was underway at this time, 
but Bullocks had not yet been allowed to bid. T 37:14-38:9. 
After the verification was made, Parkes Shewmake did the 
bidding for Bullocks, selecting the equipment they would 
need. T 50:9-20. 
-3-
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The Bullocks were successful bidders on several lots 
of equipment comprising a complete drilling outfit. The equip-
ment was not then in operable condition however, and was left 
on the auction site. The site was controlled by some third 
parties who had been involved in the auction, and for their 
convenience, the equipment was moved to another spot on the 
same site within a few weeks. T 59: 7-16. Though respondent 
Bailey's~guard was on the site for ten days (T 115:9), the 
successful bidders were responsible for any loss of their 
equipment. T 170:4-10, 175: 4-11. 
Two weeks later, after the first of the year, the 
Bullocks returned to the auction site. Repairs eventually 
costing several thousand dollars were begun on the equipment. 
As the equipment was repaired, it was moved to Utah. Shew-
make, an agent of respondent Bailey Auction Company, was 
aware of the repairs and moving of equipment, having been 
present when repairs were being made. · T 53:27; T 54; T 93:13; 
94: 8. Joe Bailey, President of respondent Bailey Auction 
Company, claimed he was not personally aware of the repairs 
or moving. T 116:18. Bailey indicated, however, that he 
was personally unaware of what Shewmake knew or did as an 
auction company official. T 116:26, 122:16. 
The equipment remaining at the lot was entrusted 
h . h were controllin·g-1 by Bailey Auction Company to t e parties w o .. 
T 115 ·.17-24. These partieo other activities on the premises. [ 
were cooperative with the truck driver who transported the 
-4-
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equipment to Utah, and indicated to him equipment on which 
Bullocks had been successful bidder. T 105:28; 107:11-108:22. 
Meanwhile, unexplained difficulties delayed the 
financing. In mid-January, 1973, as the equipment was being 
moved to Utah, Mrs. Bullock met with Parkes Shewmake and a 
representative of the leasing company in Las Vegas, Nevada 
to discuss these financing problems. Shewmake was aware 
Mr. Bullock was not present because he was moving equipment 
to Utah. T 69:8. This testimony is uncontroverted. Following 
a phone call to Bailey the leasing company representative 
suggested that Mrs. Bullock should make out a personal check 
in the amount due for the equipment to give some evidence of 
her intent to make payment. T 71. The check was marked on 
the reverse: "Not to be presented to the bank for collection 
until adequate financing is completed." T 14:8. Joe Bailey, 
however, attempted to negotiate the check a few days later. 
The day after the January meeting, the leasing company ex-
ecuted a letter of intent to grant financing to further 
reassure Bailey Auction Company. Exhibit P-3. 
After the last piece of equipment went in transit 
to Utah in late February, 1973, Joe Bailey called the parties 
who controlled the lot, and objected to the moving of the 
equipment. Those individuals spoke with Mrs. Bullock, but 
the question was moot as all the equipment was gone. T 74. 
By March, 1973, all the equipment had been transported 
to Washington County, Utah, and was being guarded by a Bullock 
employee, Bob Hood. Hood informed Mrs. Bullock on March 4 
-5-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that Bailey Auction Company's accountant was in town and 
intended to sell the equipment. T 77 23 At t · l : · ria , Mr, 
Bailey testified that he had already contacted other bidd~s 
on the equipment at this time, sold part of the equipment 
in question to one or more of them and the purchasers had 
sent trucks to Utah (T 136:18-27), but these facts were 
then unknown to the Bullocks. T 117:26-118:1. Because of 
the threat of dispossession, Bullocks obtained the tempor-
ary restraining order March 4, 1973, at 2:00 p.m. As a re-
sult of the issuance of this order, the intended purchaser's 
trucks were unable to obtain the equipment, and returned to 
Texas empty. T 136:27-137:8. Record, p. 219 H. The ex-
pense of this trip was assessed against appellants. Costs 
allegedly incurred by Bailey Auction Company to come to St. 
George to have the temporary restraining order lifted were 
also allowed as damages by the trial court. When the 
temporary restraining order was dissolved March 8, 1973, at 
4: 00 p. m. (T 18: 9) , the equipment was removed from Utah and 
subsequently sold. 
It was stipulated and testified at trial that the 
resale of the goods was without notice to the Bullocks (T 
19:5; 118:18-22; 200:4-8), and without published notice. 
T 118:11. . pell ants The court, nonetheless, assessed against ap 
the costs of resale ($500. 00) and the amount of diminution 
of respondents' commission caused by an allegedly lower 
resale price ($750.00). Appellants, being without notice. 
-6-
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rebid the equipment, which had been greatly improved and 
repaired at appellants' expense. 
ARGUMENT 
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy Bullock 
maintain that the judgment below was erroneous in assessing 
damages against them for costs of resale incurred by Bailey 
Auction Company and the amount of diminution in cormnission 
occasioned by resale at a lower price than that bid by Bul-
locks. Such judgment was erroneous because Bailey Auction 
Company elected its remedy by reclaiming the sold goods, and 
thus is precluded from any further recovery. 
Appellants Russ Bullock and June Mundy Bullock and 
Western Surety Company maintain that assessment of any damage 
against them for losses or expenses due to the temporary re-
straining order judgment was erroneous. The claim of error 
is made because allowance of such a judgment would vitiate 
the Uniform Commercial Code, and there is no factual basis 
or legal theory for such a judgment declaring the issuance 
of the temporary restraining order improper. 
POINT I 
RECLAMATION OF THE AUCTIONED GOODS BARS ANY OTHER RECOVERY 
In the present case, recovery of the auctioned 
equipment was effected by the respondent. Respondent con-
tends, however, that he is further entitled to recovery of 
expenses and loss occasioned by resale. Allowance of both 
of these remedies is precluded by Article 2 of the Uniform 
Corrrmercial Code. 
-7-
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a. Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs th' 
~ 
Auctions are clearly within the scope f A 
o rticle 2, 
the Sales article, by specific inclusion. Utah Code Am. 
70A-2-328. The statute itself adopts the language of treatis; 
and case authority in stating that "[a) sale by auction is 
complete when the auctioneer so announces by the fall of the 
hannner," Utah Code Ann. 70A-2-328(2). 
Though respondent contended below that no sale was 
made because there was no payment, the court did not so find. I 
While the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law state that 
a condition of the sale was payment "by cash, cashier's check, 
or acceptable financing," (Record p. 218 V 5.) and that such 
payment "was a condition precedent to the consumation [sic] 
of such sale," (Record p. 218 4J3) that does not mean there 
was no sale. Since consummation in its usual sense means 
"to complete or to carry out," the finding that payment was 
a condition precedent to the completion of obligations under 
the sale is consistent with the existence of a sale contract 
subject to Article 2 .· The contract made at the fall of an 
auctioneer's gavel is executory, State v. Clinger, 238 P .2d 
1145 (Idaho 1951), because the fall of the gavel only sig-
nifies acceptance of the offered bid and formation of a con-
tract (see Corbin on Contracts, (One Vol. Ed) § 108 (1952)' 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 27),not that the obligation1 
of the contract are discharged. 
d ' 1 · an· auction sale'is In respon ents counterc aim 
clearly pled. Record 31 4J4. Furthermore, prior to putting 
I 
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on evidence, it was stipulated to that the property in ques-
tion was sold by the Bailey Auction Company to the Bullocks. 
The testimony of Joe Bailey was replete with the use of the 
words buy, sell, sale, purchase and purchaser. T 8:28-9:1; 
T 169:15-16. In fact, ~r. Bailey admitted that the bid was 
accepted when the actioneer said sold and that the respon-
sibility for the items then rested with the bidder. T 
175:8-11. The facts in this case clearly fall within the 
definition of a sale as set forth in 70A-2-328, subject to 
Article 2. This case is one of offer, acceptance and breach 
of contract by the Plaintiffs. 
Though the sale agreement had terms and conditions 
one of which was payment there was a sale agreement nonethe-
less. That fact brings the transaction within Article 2 of 
the Code. The fact that there has been no payment did not 
mean there was no agreement, it simply meant there had been 
a breach of the sale agreement by the appellants. 
b. Under Article 2 reclamation of goods bars any other remedy. 
Remedies under Article 2 are enumerated in Part 
Seven. A seller's remedies for buyer's breach in general are 
found in U.C.A. 70A-2-703. Remedies enumerated are withhold-
ing or stopping delivery of undelivered goods, reselling the 
undelivered goods and recovering the damages, recovery of 
damages for nonacceptance of undelivered goods, or cancellation 
of the sale with respect to goods yet undelivered. This sec-
tion does not give the seller the right to repossess its 
goods. The official comment to Section 70A-2-703 states that 
-9-
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"[T]his section is an index section which gathers together 
in one convenient place all of the various remedi'es open to 
a seller for any breach by the buyer." A d" prece ing section, 
§70A-2-702 does give the seller a limited right to reclaim 
the goods from the buyer upon the buyer's insolvency. 67 
Am. Jur. 2d, "Sales", §575. A similar right of reclamation 
exists under §70A-2-507(2). This should not be confused 
with the right of repossession under Article 9 of the Code 
dealing with secured transactions. 
Under Article 2 the reclamation may only be made 
under certain terms and conditions and "[s]uccessful reclama· 
tion of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to 
them." (Emphasis added) U.C.A. 70A-2-702(3). B~cause the 
respondent Bailey _ _Auction Company reclaimed the goods in 
question the phrase just cited from §70A-2-702 should be 
dispositive of this case. Respondent Bailey Auction Company's , 
reclamation of the goods prohibits the grant of other 
remedies. Paragraph 3 of the official comment to §70A-2-702 
indicates the theory behind this one action concept of Article 1 
2. Reclamation under 70A-2-702 allows such preferential 
treatment as against other creditors, that no other remedy is 
to be allowed a seller if a breach is remedied by reclamation. 
The remedies claimed by the auction company in the 
present case are actually those specified in 70A-2-703(d) 
(authorizing resale and recovery of damages) and 70A-2-706, 
(outlining the procedure for resale and recovery), and 
70A-2-710 (allowing incidental damages.) All ot 
-10-
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dies, however, assume that the goods were never removed 
from the Seller's control and thus never "reclaimed" as 
provided under Section 70A-2-702. Respondent, nevertheless, 
was granted judgment for the costs of resale ($500.00) and 
the diminution in his COTIIlilission by reason of the lower 
resale price after his reclamation of the goods ($750.00). 
Further, the trial court allowed a deficiency judgment and 
incidental damages, when all of remedies are expressly 
barred by 70A-2-702(3). 
This argument, that reclamation precludes the 
award of a deficiency judgment was made before the trial 
court, T 135:1-3, and in appellants' Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities submitted December 22, 1975. Record, p. 190. 
The.trial court's failure to apply Section 70A-2-702(3) to 
this fact situation thus disallowing any remedy beyond the 
self-help reclamation was error. 
c. Respondents' failure to comply with other sections of the 
Code bars the remedies granted. 
Respondent claimed, and was awarded damages -
for the deficiency of-the commission he actually received as 
compared to the commission he would have received had 
appellants made payment under the sale.agreement. Section 
70A-2-706 allows such a deficiency judgment only in a 
situation where Seller has the right _to resell goods, for 
example, where a breach occurs prior to delivery. This 
section of the Code requires that the resale be made in 
good faith and in a reasonable manner, and where the resale 
is private, the Seller must give the Buyer reasonable notice 
-11-
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of his intent to resell. The evidence was uncontradicted 
that Bailey Auction Company failed to notify the appellants 
of its intention to resell. T 19:5; 118:18-22; 200:4-8. 
Furthermore, the evidence showed that at the time of repos-
session, three trucks were enroute from Abilene, Texas, on 
behalf of a buyer who had purchased part of the equipment in 
question. T 136:18-27. 
Article 9 of the Uniform Cormnercial Code contains 
language very similar to that found in Section 2-706 allowing 
deficiency judgments. Under §70A-9-504'·where a secured party 
fails to give notice to the debtor of a sale, courts almost 
uniformly hold that the secured party is denied any deficiency 
rights he may have had against the debtor. Skeels v. Universal 
CIT Credit Corp., 222 F.Supp. 696, 1 UCC Rep.Serv. 639 (W.D. 
Pa. 1963). See, One Twenty Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass. 
App.Dec. 64, 5 UCC Rep.Serv. 792 (1968); In re Bro. Cliff, 
Inc. , 8 UCC Rep. Ser. 1144 (Ref. Dec. W. D. Minn. 19 71) ; Associa-
ted Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S. 646 
(Civ. Ct. 1956); Foundation Discounts Inc., v. Serna, 81 N.M. 
474, 468 P.2d 875, 7 UCC Rep.Serv. 854 (1970). 
For example, in the Georgia case of Braswell v. Am~j 
National Bank, 117 Ga.App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420, 5 ·ucc Rep.Serv.I 
f · 1 to alle•.: 420 (1968), the Georgia Supreme Court held that ai ure . · 1 
and prove proper notice under Section 9-504 precluded the plain· 
I 
I 
tiff-creditor from recovering a deficiency judgment against 
the debtor. Likewise, in Baber v. Williams Ford Co., 23 9 
Ark. 1054, "396 S.W.2d 302, 3 UCC Rep.Serv. 83 (1965), the 
-12- J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Arkansas Supreme Court held th&t if the secured party were 
to hold the debtor liable for any deficiency, " [ i] t must 
give the debtor 'reasonable notice'". Id. at 1057, 396 
S.W.2d at 304, 3 UCC Rep.Serv. at 86. 
U.C.A. 70A-2-706 provides for a similar form of 
notificacion by the seller to buyer. Here the seller failed 
to notify the buyer of its intention to resell until after 
the fact, The policy applicable ·to the Article 9 cases as 
cited above is equally applicable to an Article 2 case such· 
as this one. Denial of a deficiency judgment is the appro-
priate sanction in this case where the seller fails to give 
notice. 
POINT II 
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES TO COMPENSATE FOR LOSS ALLEGEDLY OCCASIONED 
BY THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER WAS IMPROPER 
The court awarded damages to respondent for the ex-
penses incurred in the attempted repossession by respondent's 
agents and also allowed the expense incurred by the second 
purchaser when his trucks traveled to Washington County, 
Utah, from Texas and returned without obtaining the equip-
ment then subject to the temporary restraining order. Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, R., p. 219 V 12(a). 
To allow respondent to recover such damages is to 
allow a recovery of expenses for the doing of an illegal act, 
and could only encourage contravention of the law. The Court 
has made appellants liable for respondent's expenses caused 
by resistance to respondent's extra-legal repossession. 
-13-
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The Court apparently felt that the attempted : repo: 
session was justified because the Bullocks were not entitlec 
to possession of the equipment and because the Bullocks hac 
not "paid" for the equipment. 
a. Uncontroverted evidence indicates appellants' possession 
was consensual. 
Though the court found that the appellants took u., 
equipment from the auction site without permission, there wa; 
uncontradicted evidence to the contrary. The consistent 
testimony of June Mundy Bullock and r;len Stanley was that 
Parkes Shewmake, an auction company official and the site 
managers released the equipment without protest. T 53:27; 
T 54; T 93:13; 94:8; T 105:28; 107:11-108:22. Joe Bailey 
testified he was personally unaware of any acts of Parkes 
Shewmake on behalf of respondent Bailey Auction Company. The 
delivery of the equipment to the Bullocks was consensual and 
they had the right to possession. Of course, even if appel· 
!ants' ·possession was nonconsensual Bailey had no right to a 
repossession without. consent. The courts were the proper 
forum for Bailey Auction Company to seek a remedy. 
The court further found that "payment ... [was] 
to be made on the date of sale by cash, cashier's check, or 
approved financing, and the Plaintiffs (appellants) did fail 
to pay as provided and agreed" Findings of Fact ,5, R.21J. 
This Finding also is unsupported by any evidence. At no 
point in the record is the testimony of June Mundy Bullock 
contradicted that Bailey Auction Company had approved her 
' 
\ 
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financing. T 29:19; 33:19-34:5; 34:14-38:9. Admittedly, the 
financing fell through, and satisfaction of the debt was never 
made, but on the day of the auction and for a period of time 
thereafter, the financing was acceptable to Bailey Auction 
Company. See, Testimony of Joe Bailey, T 166:20-167:22. 
b. Nonpayment did not justify the attempted self help reclamation. 
In ruling for the dissolution of the temporary restrain-
ing order, the court relied on the nonpayment rationale: 
Frankly, Mr. Allen, the Court intends to grant 
Mr. Foremaster's Motion to Quash and Dissolve 
the temporary restraining order, you having 
admitted that the payment hasn't been made and 
the Court having given you an opportunity to 
state what the agreement is, doesn't believe 
that's sufficient to restraining [sic] the 
defendants from reassuming possession of this 
particular piece of property ... [T]he facts of 
life being what they are in all likelihood 
Joe Bailey Auction Company and the other Defen-
dants are entitled to the money that is due and 
owing them. Reporter's Transcript (of hearing 
on Temporary Injunction and Restraining Order,) 
p. 5. 
The court seems to have felt that because money was 
yet owing under the sales agreement, repossession without 
notice was a proper remedy, even though no security interest 
was retained by the Seller. In the judgment below, the court 
allowed respondent monetary damages for appellants' refusal 
to allow respondent to successfully effect a self help repo-
ssession without notice. In so acting, however, appellants 
may be said to have only required respondent to follow the 
proper procedures outlined in detail by Article 2 of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code. 
The simple fact of a non-payment by appellants did 
not justify respondent's nonconsensual repossession without 
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notice. Nonpayment was a breach of the sales contract made 
when the gavel fell. Remedies for breach listed in Article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code simply do not include 
reclamation without notice. Section 70A-2- 702 allows recla-
mation only upon notice given within ten days of the sale, 
or if there has been a misrepresentation of solvency by the 
buyer, the notice may be given at any time. Testimony did 
not indicate that notice of repossession was ever given to 
the Bullocks, nor did testimony show any discrepancy of under·' 
standing between the Bullocks and the auction company as to 
their solvency. The right of reclamation under 70A-2-507(2) , 
I 
is subject to the same limitations. Section 70A-2-705 allows' 
a reclamation of goods from a carrier, before they have reachei: 
the buyer, but in this case the reclamation was made after 
delivery to the buyer. 
A case analogous to this present case is Stumbo v. 
Paul B. Hult Lumber Co., 444 P.2d 564 (Or. 1968). Stumbo 
supplied logs to Keystone, a mill which became insolvent. 
Keystone had failed to pay for logs delivered, so Stumbo 
effected a self help repossession by pulling some logs from 
Keystone's pond and selling them to Hult, another mill. Hult'! 
agent retained the proceeds of the sale, and Stumbo sued for 
that amount. Southern Logging Company. which also supplied 
logs to Keystone, sued to garnish the proceeds of the sale, 
claiming the money was Keystone's property. The rights of 
h depended Southern Logging Company and Stumbo to t e money 
on the validity of Stumbo's self help reclamation. 
If Stumb0 
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was justified in reclaiming the logs, the proceeds of the 
sale were his. If the reclamation was improper, the proceeds 
belonged to Keystone and were subject to garnishment by 
Southern Logging Company. The Oregon Court examined the Uni-
form Commercial Code provisions cited above, noting the ab-
sence of a timely demand and that the logs were in Keystone's 
possession and found the self help repossession unjustified. 
Consequently, we conclude that plaintiffs 
had no right to recover the logs from Key-
s tone and were no more than unsecured general 
creditors without any interest in particular 
assets of Keystone, including the logs taken 
from Keystone's millpond. See generally, 
Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contract Relat-
ing to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform 
Commercial Code; A Roadmap for Article Two, 
73 Yale L J 199 (1963). Id., 572. 
The attempted reclamation in this case was also not within 
any of the sections of Article 2 and therefore the order 
restraining this reclamation was proper. 
encoura es contravention of the Uniform 
To allow a seller damages for failure to successfully 
remedy a situation through extra legal techniques not granted 
nor condoned by the Uniform Commercial Code due to the buyer's 
rightful resistance to those extra legal techniques is offen-
sive to the law and the policy behind it. Because respondent's 
first attempted reclamation of the property was in direct 
contravention of Utah law, there should be no compensation 
for expenses incurred in pursuing an extra-legal remedy un-
successfully and in being temporarily restrained by court 
order in so pursuing that extra-legal and unlawful remedy. 
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Simply stated, the appellants' n_etition for the t emnorary 
restraining order and the issuance of the order itself was 
properly done in light of the fact that appellant at the tk 
of the order's issuance was proceeding directly in contravent 
of Utah law. To hold otherwise is to emaciate the protectiv1 
nature of the prophylactic provisions of Article 2 of the 
Utah Uniform Commercial Code and to put a premium on self-
help, no-noticed repossessions in contravention of the law. 
POINT III 
THE DAMAGES AWARDED ARE NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY THE EVIDENCE 
Several of the amounts awarded against the appellan: 
are not found at any point in the evidence. At paragraph 
ll(b) of the findings and conclusions, R.220, $1,500.00 is 
included in the damage awarded as an amount pai!d tJo Parkes 
Shewmake. Joe Bailey testified at trial, without documentary 1 
support, that Parkes Shewmake was paid "about two hundred 
dollars a day" for six days (T 143: 10-29) and incurred $518.il: 
i 
in expenses. T 142:4-6. Note since Shewmake would have been I 
paid the same by Bailey whereever he was during those six day:, 
because the figures testified to do not equal the amount awarOi! 
one can only speculate how the court calculated this amount. 
Paragraph 11 (c) of the findings and conclusions in· 
dicates $800.00 was incurred as expenses by Joe Bailey. The 
h t they amounted only evidence of Mr. Bailey's expenses was t a 
to $3 70. 88. T 145: 30. Figures on this expense sheet were 
challenged by appellants as expense account inflation. 
T 196:27-197:6. 
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Paragraph ll(d) of the findings and conclusion awards 
$500.00 to respondent for expenses incurred by Cecil Biggs. 
Bailey testified that Biggs was paid $500.00 wages during the period 
in question. T 146:13-21. However, Bailey also admitted 
that Biggs would have incurred this expense whether or not the 
temporary restraining order had been issued. T 196:18-20. 
Therefore, no causation was shown as to these damages. 
Also the source of the $500.00 figure for costs of 
resale of in paragraph 13 of the findings and conclusions is 
unclear. Not knowing how the court calculated this amount, 
since there was no testimony by Bailey of a cost of resale in 
that amount, results in it being impossible to determine if 
this award was proper. 
Appellants submit that the absence of substantiation 
by testimony or exhibit, for the amounts awarded by the court 
renders the findings and conclusions illusory. The apparent 
use of balancing and approximation on some accounts is not 
an acceptable method of measuring damages. 
CONCLUSION 
The judgmerit below granted recovery to respondent 
(1) for expenses of effecting a resale of the auctioned 
equipment and (2) for loss of commission by the resale 
price being lower than the price agreed upon by appellants, 
and also (3) for damages allegedly sustained when respondent 
was restrained from effecting an illegal self-help repossession. 
Appellants request reversal of the judgment below 
on the ground that under the Uniform Corrrrnercial Code the re-
spondent's reclamation of the property bars any other recovery, 
including incidental and deficiency damages and also because 
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r 
procedures to obtain such damages were not followed. Also, 
the temporary restraining order was properly issued, to Prev;· 
respondents' extra-legal repossession, thus prohibiting any 
recovery for its supposedly wrongful issuance. Further, the 
amounts of the awards are not supported by the evidence. 
DATED this :J'-!"!f! day of June, 1977. 
FRANK A. ALLEN 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
h . ");/ ~ d f J I do hereby certify that on t is =-<_.,.._-_ ay o une, 
1977, I did mail a correct and true copy of the above and 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANTS to Mr. Phillip L. Foremaster, 
Attorney for Defendant and Respondent, 49l~ E. Tabernacle, 
St. George, Utah 84770. 
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